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Abstract:
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi, contrary to common perceptions, is one of the
most methodological and efficient genocides in human history. The widespread use of violence,
both physical and sexual, was central to the realisation of genocide ideology. This violence has a
current estimate of around 1,070,000 killed, and an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 who experienced
sexual violence during a period only spanning three months. 1 The genocide produced the first
conviction of rape used as a weapon of genocide with the conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu. The
Rwandan Genocide had revealed the impact where gender, particularly masculinity, has within
genocide and conflict. It has led me to wonder how exactly genocide impacts conventions of men,
particularly masculinity and its power dynamics. Men are largely reported to be the main targets
of genocide and the main perpetrators. 2 Contextually, Rwanda in 1994 was very traditional in its
conceptions of masculinity, with traits such as being a “warrior” and a “provider” as focal points
to masculine identity. My research begs the following questions: what are Rwandan concepts of
masculinity? How was it used as a tool to inform genocidal activity both physical and sexual? How
could it be used to dehumanize or target victims? Relatedly, what is the place masculinity has in a
post-genocide society and reconciliation? Respectfully, my argument is twofold: firstly, I argue
that while masculinity is not central to genocide ideology, it played a present but silent role in
influencing men to commit genocidal acts and; secondly, masculinity has a role in the postgenocide healing process, trauma, and function of the family unit.
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The Rwandan Genocide Against the Tutsi in 1994 revealed one of the worst humanitarian
disasters and genocides in history, with one of the most efficient and methodological killings of a
targeted group in human history. The absolute eruption of death and suffering fermented by
centuries of colonialism, intergroup distrust and conflict, and economic disruption, had left the
small Eastern African country in a complete state of functional failure and social catastrophe. The
trauma was exasperated with the international community standing idle during such widespread
and destructive violence. Rwanda provides a compelling case study in violence, particularly
genocide, in how relates to the various segments of our lives, and the subsequent healing efforts.
This is doubly true when it comes to the issues of gender and its relationship to violence.
After the genocide had ended in Rwanda, the country was left with wounds that were
deeply engrained with gender dynamics. This is especially apparent with the conviction of JeanPaul Akayesu to the use of rape as a weapon of genocide, the use of AIDS as a weapon, the
thousands of children born due to rape, and the targeted decimation of Tutsi men and boys. The
genocide has produced a wealth of scholarly work and attention to the empowerment and place of
women during and after the conflict that has resulted in more gender-sensitive mindsets in policy
and study of conflict. However, there is a group that is hidden in plain sight, and that is the place
of men. When we study the Rwandan genocide, we understand that men were reported to be the
largest perpetrators and victims of the conflict, however, the discussion tends to end there. It begs
the question of how men and boys were persuaded to participate in violence, and how they were
uniquely targeted. What informed their mindsets into perpetrating or “turning Interahamwe” (a
name coming from a group of young male militiamen attached to the genocidal regime). Thus, to
understand how men corresponded with violence, it is worth examining the role of masculinity
with violence.
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For context, Rwanda in the 1990s was split between two “ethnic” groups, Hutu and Tutsi,
in which the mixing of colonial race science and political management had turned their social and
class groupings into weaponized and highly vitriolic social conditions for almost a century and a
half. 3 There was increasing economic stagnation and recession due to the devaluing of Rwandan
agriculture and massive military spending. 4 Lastly, there were insurgent incursions from
neighbouring Uganda by the Tutsi refugee-led Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which posed a
threat to the Hutu-led regime of President Habyarimana and the “Mouvement républicain national
pour la démocratie et le développement” (MRND). Genocidal violence was widespread and
extremely effective, with neighbourhoods imploding within themselves. Men tended to be the
largest demographic of killings, but women largely experienced other forms of violence in addition
to killings, most notably sexual violence. 5
The goal of this paper is to examine the place that masculinity had in the genocide, and
how traits of masculinity had manifested in assisting the carrying out of violence to the benefit of
the Hutu-Power regime and its ideologies. I will be outlining and arguing how Rwandan
perceptions and roles of masculinity and how they may have been used or understood that led to
violence, both physical and sexual. I will also examine the perceptions and place of women in
relation to men, and how those dynamics influenced violence against women as opposed to men.
Further, I will explain the changes and differences in which masculinity and male gender norms
have shifted in a post-genocide environment, and how they have come to be part of the healing
effort to the Rwandan social and family dynamics. Lastly, it is worth stating that I am not asserting
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that Rwandan perceptions are inherently violent or malevolent, but inspecting how these norms
and perceptions may be utilized or weaponized for violent goals. Included will be primary
Rwandan accounts into gender, the genocide, and the post-genocide reconciliation process, as well
as prior research of academics and NGOs. Using the Rwandan genocide as a case study, I seek to
inspect the intersectional dynamics of gender, violence, genocide, and conflict.
Rwandan Masculinity:
To fully understand how masculinity could be weaponized into genocide ideology, one has
to understand the features of which it holds dear. Rwanda, much like many other African societies,
is deeply connected to traditional gender norms especially in the case of masculinity. Rwandan
masculinity is marked with two main foci, with significant importance placed on both providership
and protection. These aspects place the Rwandan man as a worker and as a warrior in his family
unit and the head of his household. Additionally, because of his role as the head of the household,
traditionally this has meant that he has both the right and duty as a procreator. This is contrary to
the Rwandan woman as a domestic supporter and a nurturer, in other words “the ideal wife and
mother.” To understand what was expected as a Rwandan woman is also important in
understanding why male perpetrators may have acted against women, particularly in the form of
sexual violence. In the following section, I will discuss these conceptions of both women and men
to fully understand their roles in why men would be persuaded in committing violence.
Arguably, the most important aspect of masculinity in Rwanda is the role a man has a the
“provider” of the household. For a man to be able to create, feed, clothe, and house his family is a
highly desirable (and expected) aspect. 6 This has placed emphasis on the role the man as a worker.
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This is true for the head of the household, but importantly also the eldest sons of the household. 7
Additionally, the Habyarimana regime also idealized the peasant farmer and their labour, and
expected a household to send one family member to contribute to the weekly “umuganda” (a
collective community labour commitment), a commitment which is still practiced in Rwanda to
this day. 8 Men’s connection to their labour and to providership is a valuable relationship with his
family unit, the economic landscape, and to the state apparatus.
There is also the male role as the “warrior.” This role stimulated a sentiment of aggression
and power within Rwandan men. This male archetype was also encouraged by the state, with youth
military schools “amatorero” being mandated to most young men. 9 These schools practiced things
such as war dances, spear and sword warfare, and taught values such as patriotism, courage, and
discipline. 10 In Kinyarwandan, this form of warrior identity is called “abagabo”, and was a part
of Rwandan masculinity for either Hutus or Tutsis. 11 These masculine characteristics made the
Rwandan man into the head of the family unit and household by responsibility, but also with it
came authority which translated to a patriarchal relationship with women. This formed a power
dynamic which a male figure had right to control and, in some cases, be domineering in sexual
dynamics and family economics. 12
There is also a relational dynamic on masculinity in how it reacts to femininity in both preand post-genocide timeframes. One of the largest changes from pre-genocide to post-genocide
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Rwanda was the perceptions and expectations of Rwandan women in society. As I will discuss
later, due to the effects of the genocide on the male population of Rwanda, the demand of Rwandan
women to occupy traditionally male roles had changed those of women. However, it is also
important to understand that Rwanda was, and still largely is a patriarchal society. Before the
genocide, the role of women was closely bound to more traditional understandings and
perceptions. Fundamentally, these perceptions of Rwandan women were bound to the domestic
duties of the home, and to their role as wives and mothers, which were under the predominance of
the husband and/or the head of household. 13 Women’s purpose and function were one that firmly
resided in the private sphere of the home, and not to the public. This is a power-dynamic which
was expected and heavily maintained, and women who broke these kinds of dynamics would be
seen as “loose” or “loud”, and any outside property or holdings were largely appropriated by
men. 14 In Hutu-Power campaigns, specifically the Hutu Ten Commandments, they specifically
targeted Tutsi women as breaching this kind of gender role, and hailed Hutu women for their role
as wives and mothers. 15 Feminine sexuality was usually expressed in the same kind of sentiments,
as procreative and private. The procreativity is important to remember in pre-genocide Rwanda,
as the terms of ethnicity were often patrilineal, of which a person would inherit the ethnicity of
their fathers. 16 These norms and roles which women occupied in Rwandan society and would
translate to why and how violence would be initiated on them, or in some cases save them.
To summarize, gender dynamics in Rwanda tend to conform to traditional values and roles
for both men and women. Men were, and are, largely bound to their roles of the providers and
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defenders of the household; while women were bound to their roles of housemakers, wives, and
mothers. These roles arguably held influence in why individuals would engage in genocidal
activity, either in very proactive ways or in reactive ways. In the section to follow, I will argue that
these norms were used as an influencer or as a cause to violent activity, in acts both sexual and
physical.
Masculinity and Violence:
It goes without saying that violence and killing was inherently central to the genocide. It
was largely universal and widespread, with communities and neighbours committing violence
against one another, with both sexes and all ages participating. However, most of the violence was
largely committed by men, against men (not to discount widespread violence against women). 17
This arguably gives a sentiment that this was a conflict not only of ethnicity, but also a struggle of
masculinity and its roles. As described previously, pre-genocide Rwanda was facing not only an
economic crisis, but also a sustained perception of invasion from the RPA in neighbouring Uganda.
Arguably, these both strike and agitate the two large pillars of Rwandan masculinity: the provider
and the warrior. Additionally, the struggle of ascending to these roles could be seen as an influencer
for young men to participate, especially in the case of young men in the Interahamwe. I will also
discuss relations between perpetrator males as possible factors in violence. However, these do not
fully explain the use of sexual violence, which needs an inspection perceived threats to the
traditional family unit and gender dynamic. In the following section, I will explain how violence

Heide Rieder and Thomas Elbert, “Rwanda – Lasting Imprints of a Genocide: Trauma, Mental Health and
Psychosocial Conditions in Survivors, Former Prisoners and Their Children,” Conflict and Health 7, no. 1 (March 23,
2013): pp. 1-13, https://doi.org/10.1186/1752-1505-7-6, p.2)
17

7

could have been influenced by these aspects, the roles of men as providers, as protectors, masculine
genocide groupthink, and the perceived threat to the gender dynamic.
We will begin with the role of the Rwandan man as the provider, and how it can explain
the use of violence as a reaction to threats for the man to economically provide for their family
unit, or to advance himself and form his own family unit. Due to the failing economics of Rwanda
in the early 1990s, the ability for Rwandan men to find work and earn a living had become worse
than experienced previously. 18 This kind of economic hardship turned young men towards HutuPower as a means to express frustrations. 19 This provided a kind of “Malthusian crisis” that when
the genocide started, allowed for Hutu men to advance themselves economically to the
disadvantage of the Tutsi. This made the selling of genocidal “special umuganda” particularly easy
for the genocidaires. In fact, in the research done by Philip Verwimp, the participation in genocidal
umuganda was largely committed by the “surplus labour” of the household, which was largely the
male head of the household, or the eldest son. 20 The economic disenfranchisement easily coincided
with the genocidal ideological framework which affirmed the Tutsi minority were parasitic to the
Rwandan system, not only on the social level but also the economic level. This can be easily
identified with the fourth and fifth Commandments of the Hutu-Power movement. 21 Economic
disenfranchisement also explains the motivation and incentivization of large-scale pillaging and
robbery of Tutsi properties. 22 There is evidence towards a pointed effort of Interahamwe and
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militia recruiting among the lower portions of social and economic chains in Kigali. 23 The
economically-deprived young man was easy recruitment for the Hutu-Power movement, the
mixture of a male identity based on providership and family unit creation, and a Tutsi scapegoat
provided the Rwandan man with enough incentive to participate in genocidal activity.
By definition alone, the Rwandan role of the warrior is one that is intrinsically attached to
the use of violence. For the purpose of genocide, this is a trait that was well appropriated by
genocidaires and genocide ideology, and played direct roles into both a defensive and offensive
posturing against Tutsis. Defensively thinking, there was a sustained fear that the RPA could
invade and could commence genocide against them, as seen in neighbouring Burundi. 24 This
stoked the genocide ideology further, and many Hutu men were easily recruited into the authority’s
self-defence courses. With the assassination of President Habyarimana on the 6th of April, 1994,
the pre-existing tension of fear and existential dread had broken and subsequently spilled into
violence. The hysteria had turned their “suspicious” Tutsi neighbour into a threat. 25 Tutsi men
were particularly vulnerable as they were not seen as ordinary folk, but someone who could be
aligned with the invading RPA. This descended even to Tutsi boys as young as infants who could
be seen as “future RPA.” 26 This leads us into the offensive factors of the warrior role of men.
Genocidaires were able to compel the martial spirit of the Rwandan male as one that was to
participate in the “Hutu Revolution,” that it was a Hutu’s duty to hunt down and kill Tutsis, any
man who refused to participate in patrols or man barricades were in line with the enemy. 27 A kind
of fraternal attitude was developed for those who had participated in violence, with beer as a
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reward to be bonded over at the end of a day. 28 The intersection of violence and masculinity was
part of Hutu-Power ideology: masculinity was tied to the ability of one to be able to carry out
violence and brutality, and to be properly identified into the Hutu body politic. 29 The readiness to
use violence was not only an expectation of a man as an individual, but also his extended group
dynamic.
One of the largest outcomes of the Rwandan genocide was a realization of the impacts of
which conflict and genocide inflicts on women. As stated previously, the conviction of Jean-Paul
Akayesu was the first in history which recognized and punished the use of rape as a weapon of
genocide. This conviction comes along with the fact that the widespread use of sexual violence
(both in rape and sexual mutilation) against women was a common occurrence during the
genocide, with as many as a half million estimated occurrences. 30 Intrinsically, this violence is
gendered and is part of the underlying dynamic of gender relations and the relations between both
ethnicities. These relational dynamics were methodically exploited to further genocidal ideologies
and perpetration of violence. 31 While the violence against men was one that tended to solely fall
in line with extermination, the course of violence against women were not solely done in this
manner. This is in part due to the patrilineality of ethnicity, in which ethnicity was largely passed
down by the father, that made women essentially “less Tutsi.” 32 However, because of this view of
ethnicity, it provided cause for violence in the case of rape, and gave rise to a phenomenon of “war
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babies” or “little killers” which were the children born from genocidal rape. 33 Some perpetrators
saw Tutsi women with a potential to be “saved” from their Tutsi identities. This ties in with the
notion that women could be reintegrated into the roles which were deemed socially “good,” as
mothers and wives, and to realign these women into the gender hierarchy with masculine
hegemony. Further, there was a perception that Tutsi women were something of “femmes fatales”
and seductresses, due to their privileged, decadent, and coercive nature - were superior to Hutu
men. 34 These perceptions spawned instances of sexual violence, which Hutu men would seek to
“prove themselves” sexually by dominating Tutsi women. 35 The domination of women also
contributed to genocidal groupthink, in which sexual violence was seen as an event that provided
bonding through complicity and shared experience. 36
The use of violence by men in the genocide stemmed from various parts of their identities
which underlined Rwandan society, whether it was their place in economics, to their society, or to
women. In the post-genocide environment, these are all facets which would come to change for
Rwandan men. Which outlines the manner in which gender norms can shift to serve particular
interests and agendas, whether for genocide or for state formation. As seen through this section,
the particularities of masculinity were used in the use of violence, but in a post-genocide context,
it was used in the reformation of the socio-political order and healing of Rwanda, and the
subsequent identity formation of modern Rwanda.

Danielle Paquette, “Thousands of Women Were Raped during Rwanda's Genocide. Now Their Kids Are Coming
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34
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Post-Genocide Masculinity:
The effects of the genocide on Rwandan society had come to have unbelievable
consequences and challenges. The Hutu-led totalitarian state had completely disintegrated and
ransacked of all remaining wealth on the approach by the Tutsi-led RPA. This left Rwanda as a
near-failed state with deep social wounds. These social wounds were especially felt on the genderdynamic of the country, with many women having felt the effects of sexual violence and having
to fill the void from a new disproportional gender balance due to the deaths of men. For Tutsi men
who survived the genocide, they had to reconcile with the destruction of their family units. Hutu
men had to face the realities of the new Rwandan hegemony of the RPA/RPF (Rwandan Patriotic
Front), and those who committed crime or violence had to reconcile and face justice to their
neighbours. This had several implications on masculinity and its roles in the healing Rwandan
atmosphere. 37 The staple roles of Rwandan men shifted and were used in a post-genocide identity
formation, coming to terms with a new masculine reality and shifting gender perceptions, most of
which is tied to the political changes of Rwanda. 38
Following the destruction of most Tutsi family units, many people had found themselves
isolated from their prior source of masculine identity: their family unit which they would provide
for. In a traditional society such as Rwanda in the 1990s, it is easy to imagine the loss of this kind
of responsibility is surely to create a personal void for many Rwandan males. However, through
this void, there was an opportunity for social cohesion and healing. Fairly quickly after the events
of the genocide, a sense of shared experience and loss had many males searching to fill the familial
voids by creating informal family units, with many men taking the places of male responsibility to
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others around them, from brothers and uncles, to fathers. 39 This kind of informal network was
encouraged by the kind of connection to the responsibility which men had to their family units.
Men who lost their families also did not hesitate to remarry and rebuild their own family units to
this sense of responsibility. 40 In the economic sense, men had to adapt their perceptions of
providership to also encompass women, as the labour force demanded the inclusion of women
participation. Interestingly, these perceptions are still seen as masculine but are culturally
acceptable for women to assume. 41 The providership may also possibly explain the support in
which Rwandans give to the post-genocide RPF-led government that has prioritized economic
development, as there is no economic vacuum which creates dire social stresses for Rwandan men
and their provider role, this is greatly seen in the transformation of the “warrior man,” to the
“working man.”
Once the horrors of the genocide had subsided, the manner in which Rwandan men postured
in the sense of their “warrior” role was greatly changed due to the widespread use of violence.
This role was drawn back in from its previous macro-social level and had come to be more of a
private micro-social role which was contained down to the family unit. 42 The “abagabo” martial
identity had greatly weakened after the genocide, to something which understood as a new
“ubugabo” (virility, masculinity) formed through “ndi umunyarwanda” (New Rwandicity), to

Interviewee 2, 15th February, 2020. Stated that due to the largescale destruction of family units, informal family
units comprised of survivors occurred. This is best exemplified with “uncles” or “father” roles being occupied with
other unrelated survivors.
40
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(Chatham House Rules), 17th February, 2020. Stated that women occupying roles which were traditionally masculine
(especially in the sense of providership) were viewed positively within society. However, men occupying traditionally
feminine roles was not viewed kindly. Displaying a one-way movement in this regard.
42
Ibid., Stated that there is still a notion of the “warrior”, however, this is more protecting the family or spouse than
the state. In general, men who posture as “tough guys” are seen as foolish.
39
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build a new Rwandan post-ethnic identity and ideology. 43 The role of the warrior had been turned
further into the role of the “worker,” which would not fight for his country, but would work hard
for it. 44 Non-violence was seen as greatly preferable to violence. This was a large case for the use
of restorative justice in Gacaca as well, which strived to turn perpetrators into Rwandans who
looked past their violent, colonial, and ethnic history, in a direction towards post-ethnic
Rwandicity, pre-colonial culture, and national unity. 45
Men also had to come with the terms of navigating a new masculinity in relation to their
women counterparts, who would have an ascending role in Rwandan society. As mentioned early,
the targeting of men in killings had pressured women to take up their place in the socio-economic
life of Rwanda. However, men also had to be part of women’s healing processes as well, especially
in the case of sexual violence. 46 Additionally, women had to be sensitive to the traumas which
men faced during the genocide. 47 Due to these circumstances, it was important that gender
sensitivity was included in the healing and reintegration processes and techniques employed by
support services. This sensitivity could be exemplified with married couples being trained and
educated on the traumas and effects which the other spouse is enduring. This builds an interpersonal understanding which fosters environments that stray away from conflict. 48 It also changes
the methodology of psychosocial therapies for trauma, where men will be more open to speak
about their traumas away from women, due to their continuing perceptions that men cannot be

Williamson, Genocide, Masculinity and Posttraumatic Growth in Rwanda, 43, 50, 51, 57.
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“emotional” or “weak.” 49 This is a place where masculinity and gender have had to mold to
circumstances, or for solutions to be creative and flexible in face of gender.
In the case of transitional justice and post-conflict societies, Rwanda provides an
exceptional case in the understanding of how gender must be approached in order for them to be
holistic, functional, and successful. For the case of Rwanda, the traditional roles and norms which
society expected from men had to be molded into the new state contexts and gender realities.
Further, the Rwandan case study is also a beneficial to study where civil society and the state lie
in relation to state ideologies, identity formation and post-conflict reconciliation. Just as the
genocide itself was loaded with gender dynamics, the reconciliation and reconstruction of the state
must be sensitive to the implications of gender, not just to women, but to men as well.
Conclusion:
As discussed, Rwandan gender norms were able to persuade male perpetrators into
violence by drawing upon their unique identity traits alongside genocidal ideological lines
espoused by the Hutu-Power movement. These were further aggravated by economic
circumstances and historical intergroup tensions. Violence and genocidal activities would have
different applications which varied alongside gender lines as well, with Tutsi women receiving
differential forms of violence than Tutsi men. These gendered paradigms had implications for the
reformation of the Rwandan state not just in the function, but also reconciliation and the new
Rwandan identity. These dynamics fundamentally changed the manner of which gender was
understood and involved to the economic, social, and political systems of post-genocide Rwanda.

Ibid., Men were found to be more likely to open up about their experiences and struggles when in an environment,
due to their fear of being perceived as weak from the opposite gender. Thus, the organization would provide group
therapy sessions with men for them to open up about their experiences.
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Masculine identities have been present in conflict since the beginning of known histories,
and in many circumstances, male identity was one that was intrinsically laced with conflict. For
centuries, the implications of conflict and genocide have landed at the feet of men, whether holding
the spear or being at the end of it. Whether it is from the Roman subjugation of Carthage or
Burmese military operations in the Rakhine state in Myanmar. Understanding the specifically
masculine dimensions can give new understandings of conflict and violence which would
previously be hidden in plain sight. This presents itself in the manner of which men are compelled
to violence, or are uniquely vulnerable to it. The continued study of masculinities relationship with
violence provides a roadmap in how it can be used to benefit violent regimes and ideologies, and
possibly provide warnings for violent posturing in volatile environments which may be defused
with development of strategies in de-escalating tensions and rhetoric. The Rwandan case study
may be extrapolated to the benefit of study such as this, whether it is by the gendered paradigms
of media, state institutions, or economies, and their relationship with the citizen population of the
country. With further study, we can hope for a better version of not just masculine identity in
society, but humanity as well.
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